by Alden Guzman
Written May/June 2022
Introduction
The Ukraine crisis has put the entire world on high alert — the potential for war to engulf Europe is high. There has been overwhelming support for Ukraine in the West, perhaps due to the degree to which many people in the West can empathise with the Ukrainian’s society. Images and videos from the crisis spark a sense of injustice in anyone who encounters them. Russia seems squarely to blame for these immoral actions. However, it is extraordinarily important that we analyse the situation rationally, not governed through our emotions, to deduce exactly what the causes of the crisis are, and whether those causes justify Russia’s aggression. Only when we can differentiate the objective causes from moral justifications will we have a nuanced perspective which will allow us to synthesise an appropriate path forward. We need to get this right. The stakes haven’t been this high since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the situation could cascade into World War 3 if we’re not careful. I argue that NATO expansion, which has ostracised Russia as a great power in Europe and threatens its national security interests, is the primary cause of the Ukraine Crisis. This objective cause-effect relationship, however, does not morally justify Russian actions, especially from a liberal, Western perspective (democratic, capitalist states founded on enlightenment principles). Simply put, two wrongs do not make a right. Any wise path forward will have to carefully balance these two understandings, prioritizing existential needs of both Russia and the West, given the potential for nuclear war.
The Causes
Moscow as recently as the 1980s was effectively the political nucleus for one of the world's superpowers at the time, the Soviet Union, which was in competition for international hegemony with the United States. Russia had enjoyed superpower status for nearly half a century since the end of World War 2, with all the benefits that come with that power, namely spheres of influence to secure their interests on the world stage. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost territorial control over the many satellite states that made up the USSR. With it, Russia was reduced to great power status, and rightfully so as the defeated party of the Cold War. This structural shift, although personally liberating for many Russians, has also left some in Russia feeling sore about the declining status of their once powerful proud state.
Most importantly, it has left Vladimir Putin, Russia’s authoritarian leader since 2000, nostalgic for Russia’s glory days. As Putin noted about his feelings over the collapse of the USSR, “Anyone who doesn't regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who wants it restored has no brains.”[1] Nationalistic pride remains in Putin’s heart. He remembers a time when his nation was central to the world's political structure. However nostalgic for Russia’s powerful past Putin may be, he ultimately acknowledges that the Soviet style system has failed and cannot return. That being said, as leader of a great power, Putin, along with many others in Russia, feel that their state deserves to be respected, especially with regards to its spheres of influence, which insulates Russia from its enemies. These concerns have been a priority for Russian policy makers since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Upon the brink of the USSR’s dissolution, following the collapse of the Berlin wall, American secretary of state James Baker under President George Bush Sr. is rumoured to have told Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand one inch eastward when outlining how NATO troops could operate in the former Soviet held territory of East Germany.[2] Although this encounter is highly debated regarding its legitimacy, and no agreements regarding NATO expansion were ever formally made, it still stands that Russian leaders upon the end of the Cold War assumed that Western policymakers understood their concerns about NATO expansion[3]. NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) is, after all, a Cold War defence institution, founded by liberal nations and led by the United States, with the goal of containing the Soviet Union. It shouldn’t be a controversial perspective to see that NATO expansion up to Russia’s border would be unnerving for Moscow, given that Russia has historically perceived itself as separate from the West. Russia fundamentally perceives NATO expansion as threatening their sovereignty, security, and national self-interest. As Dr. John Mearsheimer has put it, “Imagine the outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it.”[4] He correctly assesses that the United States would not put up with such a challenge to their security. And yet, that is the situation that the West has cornered Russia into since their decline as a superpower a few decades ago.
Russia has been very clear about its perception of NATO expansion as a vital threat to their sovereignty, security and national interests. As Dr. Mearsheimer has noted, during the Bosnian war, NATO imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia and conducted bombing campaigns against Bosnian Serbs in 1995, prompting Russian president Boris Yeltsin to make fiery remarks regarding Western intervention within their previous spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.[5] Yeltsin said that “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders . . . The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.”[6] The warning was clear enough to some experts in the West: keep the security alliance away from Russia’s border and out of its sphere of influence.
Among the experts that heard Moscow’s warnings was George Kennan. George Kennan is known for being the architect of the United States’ policy of containment during the Cold War, which led to the creation of both NATO and the Marshall plan which helped to rebuild western Europe with the purpose of containing the USSR.[7] In a short piece called ‘A Fateful Error’ Kennan wrote in 1997 “that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”[8] He went on to say that “Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion . . . and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”[9] Despite this warning from a key realist Cold War strategist with expertise on Russian political behaviour, the powers that be at the time did not heed his advice. Instead, due to the unchallenged hegemonic power that the United States possessed in the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington took the advice from liberal internationalists who advised NATO expansion.[10] Since 1999, 14 nations, most of them previous Soviet controlled states, have join NATO,[11] with Ukraine and Georgia both threatening to join the security alliance since 2008.[12]
In 2014, the consequences of those decisions began to surface. Putin annexed Crimea after feeling the pressure of the ‘coup d’état’ on Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.[13] With Yanukovych out of power, and Ukraine instead led by a pro-Western government, Putin felt the stranglehold of the West tightening around Russia’s neck, and more specifically his regime.[14] This blow to Russian security came just 6 years after George W. Bush expressed strong support for Ukraine and Georgia to become members of NATO.[15] Finding the situation unacceptable, Putin made the expedient decision to invade Ukraine’s southern peninsula, securing Russian access to the black sea. Another 8 years later, after more failed communication between Moscow and the West, Putin again has used military force to secure Russia’s sphere of influence. This time, however, instead of merely looking to control a specific region within Ukraine, Putin is looking to topple the government in Kyiv all together.
Some commentators in the West have quickly jumped to the conclusion that Putin wishes to reclaim Ukraine (and potentially other former Soviet states), with dreams of recreating some kind of ‘Greater Russia’.[16] I think this is mistaken, however. The leadership in Moscow is not that naive. As Putin has stated, “anyone who wants [the Soviet Union] restored has no brains.”[17] A long-term territorial occupation of Ukraine is logistically unfeasible considering the current strength of the Russian federation. They are not the Soviet superpower of previous decades. Acknowledging this simple reality reveals Putin’s true wishes, which he spoke of in the speech he gave on February 21, 2022, before invading Ukraine.
Claims of denazification aside, which are loose moral propaganda justifications at best, Putin truly wishes to maintain and secure Russia’s sphere of influence as a great power in Eastern Europe. In his speech, Putin declares Russia’s central importance with regards to the various satellite nations that make up Eastern Europe. Although his version of history is skewed, as many historians and political analysts have noted,[18] his version of history highlights something that is, in part, true. Russia over the last 100 years has seen their sphere of influence dwindle dramatically. Under the Soviet Union, Russia had large territorial footholds in both Eastern Europe and central Asia that allowed Moscow to leverage the international system towards the Kremlin’s liking. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen a large portion of its previous allies fall under Western influence. Putin’s actions are not about reclaiming lost territory. His actions are about asserting Russia’s sphere of influence as a great power of the world in its own backyard, which previous Russian leaders have warned as vitally important for peaceful coexistence since the 1990s. It’s about Russia being able to affect their neighbours’ economic and political developments to be beneficial, or at the very least, not hostile to Moscow. Russia, like China currently, wishes to push back the liberal international order to secure the sovereignty and interests of their nation within their own region, and especially the stability and survival of the current ruling regime.
Is Russia’s war in Ukraine Just, then?
No. Causation does not inherently entail justification. Causation in this case is the result of an objective understanding involving a logical sequence of cause-and-effect events which utilises a realist interpretation of international politics. The powers that be in Russia perceive NATO expansion on their doorstep as an existential threat to their regime and its sphere of influence. This causation, however, does not mean it is justified. Justice involves moral assessment (whether actions are fair, reasonable, and oriented towards the Good), as well as legal judgement (involving laws, norms, and convention).[19] Since justice depends on both moral and legal assessment, it is informed by values and orienting principles in the minds of the individuals and society assessing the morality and legality of the situation.
From the West’s moral perspective, Russia’s war in Ukraine is not justified. The West's moral assessment is based on liberal values which cherish humanitarian principles. Russia’s actions cannot be seen as fair and reasonable, or upholding a morally virtuous position. In fact, from the liberal worldview Russia’s war in Ukraine is reprehensible. This is because the war, pursued by Putin to protect his regime and to reassert Russia’s sphere of influence as a great power, is not a fair reason for the humanitarian crisis that the invasion has created. The war is antithetical to basic human rights and freedoms that liberal states of the West hold dear. This appreciation for human rights and dignity, which underpins liberal states values structure and political orientation, means that any analysis by the West of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine concludes that it is morally unjustifiable.
Not only is the war in Ukraine unjustifiable on humanitarian principle, but the war cannot be justified either within liberal laws and norms of international politics. Prior to the second world war, theories of when states could use force and wage war, traditionally referred to as jus ad bellum, rested on the idea that sovereign authorities that govern a state were justified in waging war if it served the state’s vital national interests, which the state had the sole right to define.[20] This norm of international politics, based on the realist view of jus ad bellum, eventually led to nations asserting their national self-interest on the world stage via force, which facilitated the aggressive foreign policy strategies that eventually led to both World War 1 and World War 2.[21]
After these two devastating wars, new liberal norms were adopted internationally, and legally instituted by the United States through various international organisations to help cement new conventions regarding justifiable war to prevent catastrophic conflicts in the future.[22] Most importantly, these new norms for jus ad bellum were written into the United Nations charter in 1945, confirming that “members of the Organisation shall abstain, in their international relations, from resorting to the threat or use of force”.[23] The two scenarios where war could be justified according to the charter are either for self-defence, or if it is approved by the UN Security Council (in a sense, the executive branch of the UN).[24]
However, since the UN is a non-binding international organisation without any real military capabilities to maintain international law and order, states often undermine these liberal norms for their own interests (the American invasion of Iraq is one such example). Despite the lack of authority that international organisations hold, the norms and conventions they have set forth since the end of World War 2 has in part facilitated the remarkable and historically unprecedented long peace between great powers that recent generations have enjoyed.[25] All state actions that betray contemporary understandings and conventions of just war theory threaten to push the world back to a more aggressive, zero-sum international system, where powerful states use force as a primary tool to secure their self-interests. Liberal norms which facilitate cooperation, despite hypocrisy on America’s behalf in various circumstances, must be upheld if peaceful relations between major powers are to continue.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sets a dangerous precedent that threatens these concepts of war. The war is not happening in a faraway place like Afghanistan or Vietnam, removed from major power centres (despite how heartless that sounds). It is in Europe, on many great powers' doorstep, threatening the international stability of many of the world's most influential and powerful states. Since upholding modern understandings of jus ad bellum should be a priority and should be used as the metric for justified warfare, Russia’s actions in Ukraine can be definitively conceptualised as politically and legally unjustifiable.
In conjunction with the morally reprehensible analysis of Russia’s invasion, Western liberal states can hold firm in their views that the war is not justified. This is all without mentioning that the Ukrainians themselves as a nation are fully justified in defending their state against Russian aggression, which liberal norms of national self-determination and jus ad bellum support.
What does the wise path forward look like?
Only a synthesis between these two perspectives will yield any sustainable peace. On one hand, Russian concerns regarding their security and the perceived existential threat that NATO expansion represents for Putin’s regime should be respected and acknowledged. They are a nuclear armed state, after all. When states, or their ruling regimes, feel existentially threatened is when nuclear weapons would be resorted to. They are seen as guarantees of survival. At the same time, however, Russia should be held accountable for their unjustified aggression in Ukraine. Russia is not morally or politically justified from a liberal perspective. Furthermore, as an independent nation, Ukrainians are justified in their courageous fight for their sovereignty, and Western nations should support their liberal struggle as they already have through economic sanctions on Russia, and by providing Ukrainians with small arms like javelin missiles. However, at the end of the day, compromises must be made on issues that are not of vital interest to the major powers on either side. Namely, the existential realities for Russia and the West.
Despite the war in Ukraine threatening liberal prospects of national self-determination and sovereignty for the Ukrainian people and causing a dramatic humanitarian crisis which all in the West and around the world can empathise with, Ukraine’s fate from a realist perspective is not tied to that of the West. If we accept the notion that Russia is merely asserting its sphere of influence over its historically most important European ally to secure their own national self-interest, which over 20 years of Russian rhetoric supports, then we can conclude that Russia does not have ambitions to conquer other European states. From this assessment, we can strictly analyse if Ukraine’s fate is truly an existential threat to the West — to Berlin, Paris, London, Ottawa or Washington. The answer should be a clear no. Is Ukraine’s fate an existential threat (even if only in imagination) to Russia: yes. Definitively, yes. Russia cannot tolerate Ukraine becoming part of its enemies security alliance. This is Geopolitics 101.
If nuclear weapons were not a concern, then perhaps this realist rule to geopolitics could be ignored and the West could become more directly involved in the situation, but unfortunately, Russia has the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world.[26] Whenever nuclear weapons are in play, de-escalation between nuclear states should always be the priority. Even if the odds of their use being as slim as 1%, relations between nuclear powers should always err on the side of caution. According to some experts, odds of nuclear weapons being used as of May 2022 is already an alarming 1 -2%.[27] As mentioned previously, this is one of the most dangerous moments in modern history since the Cuban missile crisis, regarding the potential for nuclear warfare.
Of course, the Ukrainians should fight for their sovereignty and independence from Russian oversight. The West should do everything in their power to help the Ukrainian struggle short of escalating the situation in Eastern Europe on more structural levels. Economic sanctions on Russia have sent the intended message to authoritarian leaders around the world. Xi Jinping’s China, for example, has taken note of the strong response from Western states.[28] Small weapons supplies, and logistics should also continue to flood into Ukraine to help with their valiant struggle against tyrannical oversight. Sustained resistance helps secure meaningful concessions (like imposed reparation costs on Russia) if negotiations take place. All that said, the West should not escalate the situation with Putin on fundamental levels. The stakes are too high.
Despite the war in Ukraine being the closest we’ve been to nuclear holocaust since the Cold War, it seems that most people are out of touch with this understanding at the moment considering how widespread support is in the West for structural escalatory measures towards Russia. For example, it had become a popular, although alarmingly naive sentiment, for the West to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine in the early days of the war.[29] Currently, the West is on track to expand NATO membership to both Finland and Sweden.[30] These are unnecessary escalatory measures, based on reactionary interpretations of Russia’s motives, which increase the potential for catastrophe. We need to move away from escalating the potential for nuclear warfare. De-escalation is the only sustainable path forward, which requires the difficult understanding of what is existentially necessary for both Moscow and the West.
Any de-escalatory measures taken in this tragic war must recognize Russia’s concerns regarding Ukraine’s security alliances and how that could impact Russian sovereignty. Namely, Russia needs guarantees that Ukraine will not become a NATO member. Russia needs guarantees regarding the future of Ukraine politically. A realist framework for understanding this situation should be given priority over liberal idealism. We need to look for an off ramp in this tragic war, and any meaningful solution must recognize the facts of geopolitics.
Although the war in Ukraine is an unjust war, the war cannot be outright won by the West when utilising a realist framework to understand power politics. Compromises must be made. Supporting Ukraine’s struggle is a noble cause and should be pursued as long as it does not structurally escalate tensions between the West and Russia. Strong resistance ensures more leverage for Ukraine at the negotiating table. That said, Russia is very unlikely to retreat from a humiliating defeat in Ukraine before they use their nuclear might to assert their political needs. Utilising a realist perspective, where state survival, self-interest, and power politics govern international relations, Russia will not tolerate Ukraine becoming an ally to its perceived mortal enemy — the United States and the liberal West. Therefore, any solution to this horrific humanitarian disaster, when accounting for fundamentals in geopolitics, must include that Ukraine either strictly become a neutral state, or lean towards Moscow. Russia is suffering consequences, having already ostracized itself within the international community, becoming a pariah state on the decline. But all out victory supplied by the West in Ukraine should not be pursued. Instead, like the Cold War, slow containment of aggressive nuclear states, that are antithetical to liberal values, is the only long-term strategy.
Conclusion
This is the most dangerous moment in human history since the Cold War. If we are to navigate this situation wisely, not driven by fear, compassion, or arrogance, but instead with reason and humility, we need to diagnose the causes and justifications for the war carefully to make our way out of this escalating situation. As argued, Russia, from a realist perspective, was provoked over 20 years by NATO expansion to finally assert its vital self-interests to protect its sovereignty and the regime's survival by invading Ukraine. Ukraine, in rhetoric, was threatening to join NATO for the last 14 years. Russia had enough. NATO’s history of expansion, and merely the threat of their former ally joining the Cold War security institution was enough to push Putin over the edge.
That being said, we must also acknowledge in our assessment that the war is a humanitarian disaster which fundamentally undermines moral liberal values. It is causing unnecessary pain and suffering for millions of Ukrainians, who should have the liberal right to national self-determination and sovereignty. The Ukrainians are wholly justified in fighting for their own freedom.
Not only is the war immoral, but the war has broken liberal international laws governing war and undermined over 75 years of norms and conventions governing the just use of force between nation states. From a liberal perspective, the war is morally and politically unjustifiable.
However, in the realm of international politics, where there is no higher adjudicating authority than states themselves (although the rules based liberal order tries its best), might is always right, especially when it concerns a nation or ruling regimes’ survival. Due to this fact of international politics, the path forward in Ukraine must recognize that a strategy of defeating Russia in Ukraine runs an extremely high risk of pushing them to use nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons are theoretically used exactly for the purpose of deterring existential threats. Since Russia perceives Western influence over Ukraine as an existential threat, any solution will need to recognize this fact. Ukraine politically must either become a neutral state, or it must lean towards Russia. It’s not happily ever after, but it’s the lesser of all evils. Escalation towards an all-out defeat of Russia in Ukraine could spell the end of our civilization. Russia and Putin will suffer over the coming years, but the West cannot claim total victory in this particular situation. If there’s anything we should have learned from the Cold War, it’s that de-escalation between nuclear powers should always be the priority, despite however unfavourable that is in the short run. It’s the only long-term strategy.
Footnotes
[1] Michael Wines, “Path to Power: A Political Profile.; Putin Steering to Reform, but with Soviet Discipline,” The New York Times (The New York Times, February 20, 2000). [2] Patrick Wintour, “Russia's Belief in NATO 'Betrayal' – and Why It Matters Today,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, January 12, 2022). [3] Ibid. [4] John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault,” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2014. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed June 9, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan. [8] George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” The New York Times (The New York Times, February 5, 1997). [9] Ibid. [10] Stephen M. Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022. [11] NATO, “Enlargement and Article 10,” NATO, May 18, 2022. [12] NATO, “NATO Decisions on Open-Door Policy,” NATO news: NATO decision on open-door policy - 3 April 2008. [13] John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault,” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2014. [14] Ibid. [15] Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Backs Ukraine's Bid to Join NATO,” The New York Times (The New York Times, April 1, 2008). [16] “What Does Putin Really Want?,” POLITICO, February 25, 2022. [17] Michael Wines, “Path to Power: A Political Profile.; Putin Steering to Reform, but with Soviet Discipline,” The New York Times (The New York Times, February 20, 2000). [18] Glenn Kessler, “Analysis | Fact-Checking Putin's Speech on Ukraine,” The Washington Post (WP Company, February 25, 2022). [19] See various definitions from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/justice, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/just#h1, and https://www.dictionary.com/browse/justice. [20] John Baylis, Baylis Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 311. [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid. [23] “United Nations Charter (Full Text),” United Nations (United Nations), accessed June 9, 2022. Chapter 2, Article 4. [24] Ibid, Chapter 7, Article 42 and 51. [25] Christopher J. Fettweis, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26, no. 3 (August 2017): pp. 423-451. Although Fettweis argues that Hegemonic power since the end of the Cold War has created a ‘New Peace’, his article also outlines various arguments for the decline in war between major powers, including the role of international institutions that facilitate cooperation. [26] “Global Nuclear Arsenals Grow as States Continue to Modernize–New SIPRI Yearbook Out Now,” SIPRI, June 14, 2021. [27] “Will Putin Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine? Our Experts Answer Three Burning Questions.,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2022. [28] David Sacks, “What Is China Learning from Russia's War in Ukraine?,” Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2022. [29] Jason Lange, “Exclusive Americans Broadly Support Ukraine No-Fly Zone, Russia Oil Ban -Poll,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 4, 2022). [30] “Sweden and Finland Formally Submit NATO Applications,” BBC News (BBC, May 18, 2022).
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